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ABSTRACT
Throughout the past fifty years lawyers and education advocates have
used the court system to try to equalize educational opportunities in this
country and close the achievement gap. Scholars have previously charac-
terized these cases in two waves: equity and adequacy. Those cases la-
beled "equity" are those where plaintiffs asked for equalization of
education spending. "Adequacy" cases, on the other hand, are those
where plaintiffs have asked for certain resources necessary to meet a ba-
sic level of education guaranteed by the state's constitution. There has
been much debate regarding the efficacy of either type of case, with many
scholars arguing for a return to "equity" cases. In this Note, I argue that
cases formerly termed "equity" cases are, in fact, "equality" cases and
that "adequacy" cases, when brought under the correct conditions, have a
greater potential to bring equity to education.
One child says, "That's not fair!" The rest chime in. I grab a post-it
off of my desk, climb on a chair, and place the post-it high up on the
wall in front of the class, calling their attention to it. I ask Elmer, who
is all of four feet five inches tall, and Josue, who is the tallest eighth-
grader at school at six feet even, to come to the front of the room. I
make the following offer: "First person to get the post-it down gets ten
extra credit points. " Before they can even move one step, the cries of
"that's not fair" fill the room. "What would make it fair?" "Give
Elmer a chair to stand on. " "But that's not fair, " I say, "Josue doesn't
get a chair." "But Elmer needs it. It's fair that way." I've proved my
point: equal is not the same as fair. Next time one child gets something
because he/she needs it but another doesn't, almost no one complains;
if they do, the words "remember the post-it" stop the complaint in its
tracks.'
1. "Equity" is not a concept that eighth-graders generally understand. But I found
that once I started using this lesson, the students became more and more accepting of the
idea that some people needed more than others and some needed less. It seems clear to
me that if a post-it can teach eighth-graders this lesson, there must be a way to teach it to




In this century, "a good education is no longer just a pathway to oppor-
tunity-it is a pre-requisite." 2 Yet more than fifty years since Brown v.
Board of Education held that every child has an equal right to an educa-
tion,3 only some children in this county receive a good education; the rest
receive an education that leaves them far from the entrance to that path-
way to opportunity.4
Throughout the past fifty years lawyers have advanced different argu-
ments in both the federal and the state courts to try to equalize educa-
tional opportunity.5 After the Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which held that there is no fed-
eral right to an education,6 these cases moved to state courts.7 Scholars
describe these cases as emerging in two waves 8 characterized by the parts
of the state constitutions that the plaintiffs used to frame their argu-
ments.9 In the first ("equality suits"), plaintiffs argued that under the
state's equal protection guarantee they were denied an equal education.1 °
The remedy in such cases is funding equalization-i.e., districts should
2. President Barack Obama, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 24, 2009)
(transcript available at 2009 WL 459901).
3. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
4. See John Dayton, Commentary, Serrano and Its Progeny: An Analysis of 30 Years
of School Funding Litigation, 157 EDUC. L. REP. 447, 462-64 (2001) (discussing school
funding shortages and the impact upon educational quality).
5. School Funding Litigation Overview: National Historical Background, http://
www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/overview.php3 (last visited Dec. 22, 2009).
6. 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
7. Avidan Y. Cover, Note, Is "Adequacy" a More "Political Question" Than "Equal-
ity?": The Effect of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education Fi-
nance, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 403, 409-10 (2002).
8. These two "waves" follow on the heels of what scholars describe as the initial
"wave," in which school finance litigation was premised upon the federal Equal Protection
Clause, rather than state constitutional guarantees. William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When
"Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Mat-
ters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 556-57 (2006).
9. Id. at 556-58 (arguing that the primary wave in state courts should be termed "eq-
uity" because that was the remedy plaintiffs sought). Although where the distinction is
made might be important in other arguments and spheres, the fact that certain cases are
termed "equity" and others "adequacy" is sufficient for this Note.
10. Id. at 557-58. Koski and Reich explain:
The essence of the claim.., was the equity of school funding schemes. More specifi-
cally, courts primarily sought to achieve either horizontal equity among school dis-
tricts such that per-pupil revenues were roughly equalized by the state, or at least
fiscal neutrality such that the revenues available to a school district would not be de-
pendent solely on the property wealth of the school district (this usually meant greater
state-level involvement in educational funding through the institution of state-guaran-
teed tax base plans and, on rare occasion, state-backed equal yield, a.k.a. district
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receive money from the state in amounts such that expenditures on each
student would be equal." In the second wave ("adequacy suits"), plain-
tiffs relied on the education articles of state constitutions to argue that
the education they received failed to meet the state's promise. 12 While
that promise varies from state to state-public education must be, for
example, "thorough and efficient," "adequate," "minimum," etc.-plain-
tiffs have construed all of those promises as requiring more than a bare
minimum education and resources adequate to meet state education
goals.' 3 The remedy in these cases generally consists of a package of re-
sources meant to provide the state-guaranteed education.' 4
Scholars categorize the two waves as separate and distinct, discussing
the differences between the two and the rationale for bringing one type
of case over the other.' 5 They are, in fact, treated as so distinct that Pro-
fessor William S. Koski, an education scholar and one of the expert wit-
nesses in Williams v. California,'6 and Professor Rob Reich argue that
adequacy suits actually increase inequalities, while equality suits have the
potential to remedy inequality-two completely opposing outcomes.
17
Koski and Reich criticize "advocates and courts [for] abandon[ing] the
doctrine and rhetoric of equity and adopt[ing] the language of ade-
power equalization, plans that sought to recapture "excess" revenues from wealthy
districts).
Id. at 558.
11. Id. at 558. According to these authors, "courts primarily sought to achieve either
horizontal equity among school districts such that per-pupil revenues were roughly equal-
ized by the state, or at least fiscal neutrality such that the revenues available to a school
district would not be dependent solely on the property wealth of the school district." Id.
These goals were met through state tax plans or "district power equalization." Id.
12. Id. at 559.
13. William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat From Equity
in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 562 (2006).
14. Id. at 565.
15. See, e.g., id. at 560-61 (2006) (outlining the advantages of adequacy arguments
over equity arguments).
16. See The Williams Case-An Explanation, http://www.cde.ca.gov/eo/ce/wc/wm-
slawsuit.asp (last visited Dec. 22, 2009) (discussing the Williams v. California litigation and
settlement). This case, which was eventually settled in 2004, began as a class action lawsuit
filed in 2000 by approximately one hundred students from San Francisco County against
the State of California. Id. The students claimed that the state "failed to provide public
school students with equal access to instructional materials, safe and decent school facili-
ties, and qualified teachers." Id. The settlement resulted in the allocation of an extra $138
million to certain schools for "standards-aligned instructional materials." Id. Williams
Koski's expert report for the Williams v. California case is available at http://
www.decentschools.org/expert-reports/koski-report.pdf.
17. William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat from Equity
in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 549 (2006).
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quacy."18 While they note that "adequacy models could be suffused with
concepts of ... equity," they deny that this has happened and that these
suits are the best means to achieve equity.19
In this Note, I argue that in adopting the language of adequacy, the
parties have consistently maintained (and sometimes even enhanced)
Koski's and Reich's goal of "equity," through simply changing the words
and basing their arguments on different provisions of the law. To the
extent that adequacy suits are informed by equity concerns, they have the
potential to remedy both absolute and relative deprivation more than the
cases that Koski and Reich and other scholars have previously character-
ized as "equity" suits, even if they have not always been framed in order
to achieve this result.2 °
In making this argument, I will use the following terms defined as spec-
ified: "adequacy" as the resources necessary to meet the state constitu-
tional guarantee; "equity" as "end-result equality of opportunity" or
"fairness," meaning that every student graduates from high school with
the education needed to provide an opportunity to succeed as an adult
even if that means that some schools must be given extra resources to make
up deficiencies; and "equality" as sameness, meaning that if one school
has resource x, other schools must also be given resource x in the same
amount. In defining these terms this way, I depart from the traditional
characterizations of education cases, which would exclusively divide them
into "adequacy" and "equity" cases. I claim that what have been termed
"equity" cases are, in fact, "equality" cases because they mandate not
what fundamental fairness would require, but rather absolute equality of
resource distribution.
18. Id. at 548. The authors also target the logic behind educational movements of the
1990s, which culminated in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. Id. This act, according
to Koski and Reich, does not focus on whether children receive equal educational re-
sources, but instead focuses simply on whether "all children can learn." Id.
19. Id. at 568-69.
20. Koski's and Reich's charge that adequacy suits allow relative deprivation above
the baseline is likely true at some level. Id. at 615. But equality suits are no less likely to
allow for relative deprivation at the same level. This is because wealthier parents will
always find a way to contribute more to their own children's educations, either by voting
for greater local taxes or making personal contributions to the schools. While it would
definitely be more fair to disallow such actions, it would be nearly impossible to do so
because wealthier people would be against any action contrary to their interests and be-
cause lower income groups would see any such as action as contrary to ideals of the
"American Dream" and, therefore, refuse to support any such action as well. See id. at
593-94 (quoting Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REv. 101, 160-61 (1995)). The goal of education cases should be to
give all children a fair chance at educational opportunity; adequacy suits do that even if
they leave some relative deprivation.
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In Part II, I will describe how scholars' discussions of adequacy cases
demonstrates the "adequacy-as-equity" framework and how using that
framework instead of the prior "adequacy-versus-equity" framework
changes the current debate about adequacy litigation and implementa-
tion. In Part III, I will present education cases from California and New
Jersey that show how successful adequacy cases have not, as Koski and
Reich would contend, abandoned (and, in fact, have maintained) the con-
cepts of equality and equity from the older equal protection and funding
equality cases. In Part IV, I will present cases from Oklahoma, Louisi-
ana, and Pennsylvania in which plaintiffs have been unsuccessful, and I
will look at how the "adequacy-as-equity" framework would increase the
likelihood of success in cases in which defining the constitutional guaran-
tee is at issue and explain how this framework might operate to increase
the chances of success where the courts have found a non-justiciable
question. Finally, I look at how "adequacy-as-equity" has informed, and
can continue to inform, implementation. I conclude that while adequacy
suits have not yet made equity any more real than equality suits have,
they are the best litigation vehicle available for realizing equitable
education.
II. ADEQUACY LITIGATION: UNEQUAL AND EQUITY-MINDED
Koski and Reich argue that adequacy cases are "equity-neutral., 21 But
when the current scholarship on adequacy litigation is examined, it be-
comes obvious that adequacy cases are, in fact, equity-minded in their
ideology as well as in their remedies, and this factor is what makes ade-
quacy suits preferable. In this section, I examine how while the scholar-
ship on the cases has shown that adequacy suits are equitable, scholars'
suggestions for implementation often lack the concept of equity and need
to be reframed to include it.
The first step in an adequacy suit is defining "adequacy." There is no
single way to define the quality of education children should receive. We
know when a child receives a good education because we can see the
outputs-good test scores, college entrance, and general success. We also
know when a child receives a bad education, which is generally character-
ized by the absence of the factors indicating a good education. But defin-
ing the specific factors that constitute the former and those that constitute
the latter is not easy. In addition, while Koski and Reich charge that
advocates moved to adequacy suits because they were easier to define,2
it is even more unclear what would constitute an "adequate education"
21. William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat from Equity
in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 549 (2006).
22. Id. at 561.
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because the referents "good" and "bad" do not necessarily set the bound-
aries for it.
Regina Umpstead argues, and I agree, that much of the lack of clarity
results from the fact that in each of the states where litigation has oc-
curred, each plaintiff and each court has come up with a particularized
definition based on the state's constitution.23 But while Umpstead criti-
cizes the cases for failing to fully define educational goals and accounta-
bility,2 4 I argue that the lack of a clear-cut definition is a benefit. After
all, students, schools, and states differ in a variety of ways, and while the
desired outcomes are likely similar, if not identical, the conception of how
to reach that point will (and likely should) vary immensely. This flexibil-
ity of adequacy suits allows them to reach equitable ends without giving
up too much to simple equality. As Umpstead notes, what has remained
consistent about adequacy cases is the emphasis on funding and vertical
equity.25 The fact that funding equity remains a standard part of ade-
quacy suits, while general education goals and implementation methods
shift, is what allows adequacy suits to be equitable. If these factors were
rigid in all cases, plaintiffs would lose the flexibility that allows adequacy
to shift over time and adequacy suits would lead to inequity. It is pre-
cisely due to the flexibility of the means by which to reach the equitable
end that adequacy suits never have to ask for less than equity. In fact, the
flexibility ensures that less will never be enough because in cases where
the resources were provided in full and educational equality remained
out of reach, adequacy suits allow plaintiffs to recalibrate the resources,
measuring what is needed by how far the performance fell short of equity
and asking for more.
The ability of adequacy suits to achieve equity can be seen in the ways
plaintiffs define "adequacy." Deborah Verstegen argues that where
plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in courts, they used an antiquated defi-
nition of adequacy that rested on the idea that a bare minimum of educa-
tion satisfied the state constitution's guarantee: so long as children are in
school and the school teaches them some material, the education is ade-
quate.2 6 This definition fails to reach either equality or equity, and,
therefore, cases brought under this definition do justify Koski's and
23. Regina R. Umpstead, Determining Adequacy: How Courts Are Redefining State
Responsibility for Educational Finance, Goals, and Accountability, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J.
281, 281-82.
24. Id. at 284.
25. Id. at 296.
26. Deborah A. Verstegen, Towards a Theory of Adequacy: The Continuing Saga of
Equal Educational Opportunity in the Context of State Constitutional Challenges to School
Finance Systems, 23 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 499, 507 (2004).
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Reich's critique. 7 But successful cases do not deserve this critique and
the lessons of these cases can inform the unsuccessful cases.
The suits in which plaintiffs have emerged victorious provide a sharp
contrast in their definitions of "adequacy." Verstegen argues that in such
cases, the courts found a want of minimum education because adequacy
was defined in the context of modern needs, technologies, and specific
resources; with these factors in mind, the courts found that equality of
opportunity requires an "adequate" education be sufficient to prepare all
students, no matter their starting points, to compete equally in the
world. 8 This combination of factors shows adequacy suits' intent to
reach equity. The fact that "adequate" is defined by ever-changing needs
to fit an ever-changing world demonstrates the flexibility of adequacy
suits, which allows them to continually look toward equity, not bare mini-
mums of "equality." 29 Adequacy's true concern is equality of opportu-
nity, not equality of resources (even if that is facially what the claim asks
for) because the resources consist of what each student needs to reach the
state-imposed standards even if those needs differ immensely. Finally,
instead of limiting the concept of adequacy to any minimum, the defini-
tion of specific resources moves toward equity because it promotes the
idea that equality of funding and expenditures would not necessarily lead
to an adequate education and that certain resources may be needed in
greater or lesser amounts in order to reach equality of opportunity.
Therefore, even when the suits are composed entirely of arguments re-
garding adequate resources, the method by which adequacy is defined
within the lawsuit demonstrates that what the suits aim at is, in fact,
equity.
If adequacy is defined through the lens of equity it has the ability to do
what equality cannot. Asking for equality is often as simple as asking for
equal resources (i.e., if one child has something the other should have the
exact same), and it is difficult for society and courts to move beyond this
quid pro quo analysis, but adequacy suits can move further. Since ade-
27. This failure can be cured by inserting the concept of equity into the language and
concepts used to define "adequacy," as discussed in Part IV of this Note.
28. Id. at 508, 511-12, 523. At least seven state courts have found school finance plans
inadequate when the definition of adequacy was attached to evolving standards. Id. at
508-09. To support their findings, courts often cited the contemporary needs facing stu-
dents today, like the globalization of economies, the rapid evolution of technology, and the
rise of the Internet. Id.
29. Koski and Reich argue that we should return to equality to reach equity because
adequacy allows the "entrenchment" of current disparities. William S. Koski & Rob Reich,
When "Adequate" Isn't.- The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It
Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 611 (2006). But I believe the opposite is true-adequacy can
create systems where current disparities are diminished by accommodating the fact that
some students currently need more, while equality can only make things even.
(Vol. 12:403
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quacy suits define resources, they have the potential to make tangible
resources unequal in order to achieve equity, thereby clearly doing what
Koski and Reich contend they do not. For example, if research shows
that in order to get to college, a child in one neighborhood requires three
of x for every one of x that a child in a different neighborhood needs,
adequacy suits can require that the three of x be given.3" This is not
equality, but it is equity, and it places all children at an equal position to
meet the state minimum standards. This corresponds to what Professor
Michael Rebell characterizes as a "'meaningful' educational opportu-
nity."31 But while Rebell sees adequacy suits as currently failing to ask
for three of x and organizes his argument around the factors that need to
be requested,32 I would argue that the suits are already making the con-
siderations that Rebell demands and plaintiffs are including those factors
in their arguments to the courts.
Adequacy suits are often unsuccessful in complete implementation
even when they are successful in court, thereby stalling equity.33 This
frequently happens because the states have little interest in actually im-
30. Koski and Reich argue that defining these factors is a "hidden pitfall" of adequacy
cases because there is no defined standard for either what goals should be reached or what
resources are needed. Id. at 561. But while this is a potential problem, it does not appear
to be a practical one. Courts have used the testimony and writings of experts along with
state education standards and goals to formulate both what educational equity would look
like and what resources would be needed to get there. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott
V), 710 A.2d 450, 454 (N.J. 1998).
31. Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational Opportunity, and the Nec-
essary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1526 (2007). Rebell's definition includes
small class sizes, qualified teachers, and special services for English language learners. Id.
at 1509-10 (citing Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York (CFE II), 801 N.E.2d 326, 331,
333-36 (N.Y. 2003)).
32. Id. at 1514-26. Rebell argues that the following are needed: intelligible goals that
can rationally be met, a comprehensive procedure for attaining meaningful educational
opportunities, and a cost-effective means of guaranteeing that the necessary resources are
provided to students and teachers. Id. at 1515.
33. See ACLU FOUND. OF S. CAL., WILLIAMS V. CALIFORNIA: THE STATEWIDE IM-
PACT OF Two YEARS OF IMPLEMENTATION 15-16 (2007), available at http://www.decent
schools.org/settlement/WilliamsReportWeb2007.pdf (reporting the mixed results of imple-
menting educational reform in California); W. STEPHEN BARNETT ET AL., FRAGILE LIVES,
SHATTERED DREAMS: A REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESCHOOL EDUCATION IN
NEW JERSEY'S ABBOTT DIsTRIcrs 24 (2001), available at http://www.startingat3.org/-docu-
mentsfFragileLivesShatteredDreamsReport.pdf (indicating that a severe lack of funding is
the reason behind poor quality early education in urban areas like New Jersey's Abbott
districts); EDUC. LAW CTR., THE ABBOTT DISTRICTS IN 2005-2006: PROGRESS AND CHAL-
LENGEs 2 (2006), available at http://www.edlawcenter.org/ELCPublic/elcnews_060313
AbbottlndicatorsReport_2005_06.pdf (reporting on student progress in the Abbott dis-
tricts, the remaining challenges to improving the quality of education, and proposing solu-
tions to promote positive educational reform).
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plementing the remedies or in monitoring compliance.34 But the poten-
tial for easy monitoring, which is what makes adequacy suits attractive,
can also help make the implementation successful and the result
equitable.
The problem is that some suggestions for monitoring while ensuring
implementation will not ensure equity because they stop too soon. For
example, Josh Kagan argues that state courts should use educational in-
puts, rather than outputs (such as test scores), to define and measure ade-
quacy.35 Kagan argues that inputs are easy for the courts to monitor and
for the states to understand and comply with.3 6 This factor should not be
overlooked, as it is essential for any implementation. It is nearly impossi-
ble for any court to monitor a "provide equal educational opportunities"
mandate because it is so vague. It is equally difficult for states to meet
those mandates because the concept of "equal educational opportunities"
varies and so much debate rages over what it really means. Such debates,
while beneficial to the situation in general, interfere with the actual provi-
sion of an education.
In adequacy suits, however, it is easy for the state to know what to
provide (e.g., textbooks) and for the court to monitor what the state has
provided (e.g., the percentage of schools that have sufficient textbooks)
and what it has not (e.g., the percentage of schools that lack sufficient
textbooks), thereby ensuring that the state provided the required inputs.
But inputs are not enough to ensure equity; if suits stop there, as Kagan
suggests they should, adequacy suits would fall short of equity. This
would remain true even if the inputs included factors meant to ensure
equity, such as those Kagan suggests, like remedial funding in addition to
equal funding, state takeovers of failing schools, court-ordered changes in
management, and requirements for teacher quality.3 7 All of these factors
are meant to ensure equity because they go beyond equality, but if there
34. See W. STEPHEN BARNETr ET AL., FRAGILE LIVES, SHATTERED DREAMS: A RE-
PORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESCHOOL EDUCATION IN NEW JERSEY'S ABBOTT Dis-
TRICTS 24 (2001), available at http://www.startingat3.org/-documents/FragileLivesShattered
DreamsReport.pdf (describing the stilted progress of post-Abbott New Jersey school dis-
tricts). The report found that "state preschool policy has been trying to create the appear-
ance of compliance with the [clourt while minimizing state spending and continuing to
treat early education as little more than babysitting." Id. As a result of these poor learn-
ing conditions, children inevitably end up entering school at a disadvantage compared with
students from wealthier suburbs. Id. at 23.
35. Josh Kagan, Note, A Civics Action: Interpreting "Adequacy" in State Constitutions'
Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2244 (2003). Some of the inputs Kagan sug-
gests include "dollars, personnel, curriculum, buildings, supplies, and similar factors ... 
Id.
36. Id. at 2254-57.
37. Id. at 2274-76.
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is no measurement of performance, equity will not necessarily occur.
Scholars have an important role to play in defining the additional factors
to consider in implementation.
There are implementation models that have the potential to aid ade-
quacy suits in reaching equity, but the scholarship on these suits does not
always take the models far enough. In another article, Professor Koski
argues for a ground-level monitoring system to keep the system accounta-
ble.38 Koski argues that current enforcement mechanisms impede the
success of adequacy actions.39 He contends that the disadvantaged com-
munities aided by adequacy cases are not well-served by the tools cur-
rently used to hold legislatures, school districts, and schools accountable
because parents are unable to "[vote] with their feet" (i.e., move to a
better district or area when there is a lack of economic resources at
home) and because they do not have the resources for full political mobil-
ization.4" In Koski's view, an effective system would require state educa-
tion departments to monitor the implementation of resources and
provide an "accessible and user-friendly system of complaints manage-
ment" to parents, students, communities, and teachers through which
they can bring lacking resources to the attention of the agency responsi-
ble for correcting the problem.41
Such a system could have the potential to enforce inequalities and in-
equity, as Koski accuses adequacy cases of doing, because it reflects only
the inputs and puts the burden on those who do not have previous experi-
ence carrying it, leaving them to do a job for which they may be unpre-
pared.4" But the system also has the potential to do the opposite. First,
to reach equity, the provided resources must be given and, therefore, no
matter who is monitoring it, a system that ensures such a provision is
necessary for implementation and equity. Second, an on-the-ground
monitoring system can empower the community, giving it a means to im-
prove local control of the schools. This system can then lead to both a
push for the resources and a push for more political power and, from that
power, a push for equity with or without the lawsuit.
Even the most well-crafted implementation scheme will stall equity if it
focuses on input alone, and Koski and Reich criticize adequacy suits for
avoiding "[n]ettlesome concerns about input versus outcome equity and
38. William S. Koski, Achieving "Adequacy" in the Classroom, 27 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 13, 17 (2007).
39. Id. at 30.
40. Id. at 30-31.
41. Id. at 32-34.
42. Professor Koski, however, does not address that possibility or offer suggestions to
prevent it from occurring.
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vertical versus horizontal equity., 43 But while the focus on inputs is often
the feature highlighted in adequacy suits, adequacy suits do not need to
stop there and, in fact, rarely do. Because education involves constantly
changing standards that require new knowledge and skills nearly every
year (e.g., requiring algebra in eighth grade though it once was a high
school subject), necessary inputs can change rapidly. Therefore, agencies
(either the agency that brought the lawsuit or another so designated)
must monitor outputs in the form of test scores and graduation rates. Af-
ter all, if inputs fail to produce outputs, the inputs are not valuable and
should be reassessed and revised. This is what has already occurred as
plaintiffs reenter courts asking for more resources as education changes;
while plaintiffs have been requesting resources for over fifty years, they
have not always been asking for the same things. A functional implemen-
tation remedy demands the same fluidity and flexibility that are funda-
mental elements of adequacy cases.
The public engagement model advocated by Amanda Broun and
Wendy Puriefoy44 has the ability to maintain the necessary fluidity and
flexibility and, so, has less potential to act as a barrier to equity; indeed,
their model has a greater potential to aid it. They argue that public en-
gagement is necessary throughout the process of education reform, in-
cluding litigation and implementation, in order to produce effective
changes.45 They propose a structured and sustained relationship between
the affected community, the community-at-large, educational advocates,
policymakers, and attorneys in order to hold the state accountable for
lasting education reform.46 They argue that the public voice has been
lacking from most education debates and that this has impeded educa-
tional change.47 They define public engagement as including both the
"usual suspects" and persons who are not normally included in the de-
bate, as well as involving a structured relationship within which all parties
interact and learn to forge common goals that they can take action to
implement.48
While Broun and Puriefoy concede that this model has only partially
worked in some cases, including Abbott v. Burke (Abbott /),49 there is
43. William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat from Equity
in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 561 (2006).
44. Amanda R. Broun & Wendy D. Puriefoy, Public Engagement in School Reform:
Building Public Responsibility for Public Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 217, 217-19
(2008).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 217.
47. Id. at 220.
48. Id. at 221-23.
49. 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985). See discussion of Abbott at Part III(C)(ii) of this Note.
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potential for it to do more to ensure equity.50 Because their model does
not exist solely to monitor what has already been required and is not
structured to rely on inputs alone, it allows the participants to look at the
whole picture and develop the concept of what is equitable. In addition,
although the model is very structured, it allows for a number of different
approaches to the problem, which gives it requisite flexibility. Finally, it
does what Koski's model has the potential to do-create political
power-without the downside of placing too much of the burden on the
affected communities. The action model pulls in people from outside of
the affected communities and from within, breaking down resistance to
implementation and moving those who are used to having political power
to exercise it in a new direction. An implementation model such as this
one is likely to create the most equity because it allows for variations and
does not stop at inputs.
The adequacy of education is an evolving concept; therefore, "the defi-
nition of a thorough and efficient system of education and the delineation
of all the factors necessary to be included therein[ ] depend upon the eco-
nomic, historical, social[,] and cultural context in which that education is
delivered."51 Adequacy suits have the ability to respond to growth and
evolution in the field of education and to change in order to provide the
necessary factors to meet updated standards. Because equality suits stop
at equal, they do not necessarily provide all of the required factors and,
therefore, cannot be as responsive to change as adequacy suits. In addi-
tion, because adequacy suits have already started to build in compliance
mechanisms and monitoring processes, they can change in response to
outputs and, therefore, more effectively serve children.
50. See Amanda R. Broun & Wendy D. Puriefoy, Public Engagement in School Re-
form: Building Public Responsibility for Public Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 217, 236
(2008) (noting that case studies illustrate the possibilities presented by sustained public
engagement in support of public school reform). For example, in New Jersey, the Paterson
Education Fund, a local education fund (LEF), engaged the public to pressure government
officials to implement the mandates that education advocates had won in court. Id. at
232-33. Their success was limited in some areas, such as the initiative to build new schools,
which failed to build any new schools within the established five-year time frame. Id. at
234. On the other hand, the public engagement model was successful to the extent that it
increased community knowledge, garnered the school board's support, increased summer
school and preschool opportunities, and upgraded educational materials and existing pro-
grams. Id. at 235.
51. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 367 (N.J 1990).
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III. EQUITY: How ADEQUACY CASES STRIVE FOR MORE THAN
JUST ENOUGH
As even a passing familiarity with political debates shows and as the
hundreds of articles that have been written demonstrate, there is no ques-
tion that inequalities remain in educational opportunity today. But de-
spite all of the discussion, no clear solution has emerged. While this does
indicate that there is much work to be done, the tenor of the discussion
does not demonstrate, as Koski would argue, that the policy behind edu-
cation litigation has shifted away from a conception of equity, even if the
language used to state the claims has changed to "adequacy." What it
does demonstrate is that adequacy suits have the potential to be quite
effective in achieving equity. In this part, I look at cases that have been
argued and won in New Jersey and California under different parts of
each state's constitution. Looking at the arguments made in these cases, I
argue that successful education cases employ the concept of equity even
as they make adequacy arguments.
A. How Education Cases Arrived in State Courts: A Brief History
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court decided Rodriguez v. San
Antonio Independent School District.52 In a three-part majority opinion,
the Court first held that wealth was not a suspect class;53 second, that
education was not a fundamental right under the United States Constitu-
tion;54 and third, having determined that neither a suspect class nor a
fundamental right was involved (thus, removing the need for strict scru-
tiny analysis), that rational basis review would be applied to uphold
Texas's system of public school funding, which allocated less money to
children in poor neighborhoods than to those in wealthy neighborhoods
because it was based on local property taxes.
The decision in Rodriguez effectively foreclosed the use of the argu-
ments made in Brown v. Board of Education. The lawyers in Brown had
successfully relied on the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
guarantee to argue that the (effective) denial of educational opportunity
52. Parents of students who attended school in a district with a small property tax base
that received a disproportionately lower amount of funding than other districts brought the
suit. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 US. 1, 4-5 (1973). Under Texas's
education funding scheme, expenditures were distributed out of the state's general fund in
amounts determined by the income share and property taxes in the district. Id. at 9-10.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the Texas scheme, recognizing that the question
before it did not involve a denial of a fundamental liberty and was, thus, better suited for
debate in the state legislature. Id. at 31, 58.
53. Id. at 28.
54. Id. at 31-39.
55. Id. at 54-55.
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was a violation of equal protection;56 the decision in Rodriguez, however,
made it clear that equal protection and due process arguments would no
longer be successful in school litigation under the Constitution, at least
insofar as economic inequality was concerned.57 By applying rational ba-
sis review to uphold Texas's funding system, Rodriguez ended the use of
the federal courts as a forum in which to equalize educational
58opportunities.
The Supreme Court's less than sympathetic decision in Rodriguez and
cases preceding it led plaintiffs to seek new avenues to demand equal
educational opportunities. In 1971, two years before the decision in Rod-
riguez, the Supreme Court of California, relying exclusively on the Cali-
fornia constitution, held in Serrano v. Priest that education is a
fundamental right that must be realized equally; the quality of education
cannot depend on the wealth of the community in which the school dis-
trict is located.59
After the defeat in Rodriguez, Serrano became the model for future
educational equality suits,6" and plaintiffs in nearly every state moved
56. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 ("[W]e hold that the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segrega-
tion complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment.").
57. In addition to Rodriguez, other cases around the same time led to the demise of
Brown. Supreme Court decisions withdrawing judicial oversight from school districts that
had reached the goal of desegregation and refusing to allow certain methods of desegrega-
tion, such as busing, both led to re-segregation of the schools and built precedent that
foreclosed the use of the arguments that had made Brown successful. See, e.g., Bd. of
Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249 (1991) (holding that if the school district operates in
compliance with Brown and is unlikely to return to segregation, the desegregation decree
should be lifted); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 536-38 (1982) (upholding an
amendment to the California constitution barring the state judiciary from imposing bus-
ing). These cases have led to the both the continued segregation and re-segregation of
schools. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE
FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 261 (2004).
58. Other cases dealing with education have been brought in federal courts, but they
were brought to challenge the constitutionality of school district reforms meant to imple-
ment Brown. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 709-10 (2007).
59. 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971). Under the former California system, a district's
tax base determined how much revenue could be raised for a particular school district's
education budget. Id. Since tax bases varied greatly throughout the state, the "assessed
valuation per unit of average daily attendance" of children in elementary school in 1969-
1970 ranged from $103 to $952,156-a discrepancy of almost a 1 to 10,000 ratio. Id.
60. There is some disagreement as to which case started the finance equity wave.
Some scholars use Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) to delineate the starting
point of school finance litigation because it was the first case based on the theory of equal
funding. E.g., Deborah A. Verstegen, Towards a Theory of Adequacy: The Continuing
Saga of Equal Educational Opportunity in the Context of State Constitutional Challenges to
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from the federal courts to the state courts, challenging school funding
schemes and the disparities they create by making equal protection argu-
ments under state constitutions. 61 When these claims proved unsuccess-
ful either in court or in implementation, plaintiffs changed tactics,
bringing cases under the state constitutions' education clauses.62 These
latter cases attempted to remedy the disparity between funding and edu-
cational opportunity by focusing on the adequacy of the education pro-
vided instead of arguing for equal funding.63 Plaintiffs argued that the
educations provided were not sufficient to meet the guarantee of state
constitutions' education articles.64 They defined the resources necessary
for an education that would meet that promised in the education articles,
often characterized as "adequate," and identified the harm in terms of
what resources were missing.65
California and New Jersey are good examples both of how the "waves"
developed and of how the arguments developed with time. While Koski
and Reich argue that the major trend in recent years has been away from
targeting specific resources to poor and minority students and toward
one-size-fits-all schemes,66 I argue that the cases from these two states
show exactly the opposite. It is clear from looking at the cases from both
of these states that, while plaintiffs re-characterized their arguments over
time, neither the plaintiffs nor the courts lost the idea of equity and have
School Finance Systems, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 499, 505 (2004). I use Serrano,
however, because it was the first case to be decided on equal funding grounds, even if
equal funding was not the argument originally advanced by the plaintiffs.
61. Access Quality Education: School Funding Litigation Overview, http://
www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/overview.php3 (last visited Dec. 22, 2009).
62. Id. During the 1970s and 1980s, defendant states won approximately two-thirds of
those cases. Id.
63. Id.
64. E.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1), 495 A.2d 376, 380 (N.J 1985) (describing plain-
tiffs' claim that empirical evidence demonstrated that their school districts had inadequate
funding due to a "lack of an adequate tax base for educational purposes"); First Amended
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 7, Williams v. California, No. 312236
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2000), available at http://www.decentschools.org/courtdocs/OlFir-
stAmendedComplaint.pdf (pointing out that "[tihe [c]onstitution and laws of California
require the [s]tate to ensure the delivery of basic educational opportunities for every child
in California and vest the [s]tate with ultimate responsibility for the [s]tate's public elemen-
tary and secondary school system").
65. E.g., First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 9, Wil-
liams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2000), available at http://
www.decentschools.org/courtdocs/0lFirstAmendedComplaint.pdf (citing a lack of school
supplies and unsafe learning conditions).
66. William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "'Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat from Equity
in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 571-72 (2006). The
authors argue that this shift "may not enhance equality and indeed may exacerbate existing
inequalities." Id. at 572.
[Vol. 12:403
ADEQUACY LITIGATION
moved from one-size-fits-all funding equity schemes to remedies for the
inequities.
B. California
In California, plaintiffs have brought cases both under the federal
Equal Protection Clause and the education clause of the California con-
stitution. By examining the contrast between the equality arguments
made in Serrano67 and the adequacy arguments made in Williams,68 it is
clear that adequacy arguments have the potential to advance equity,
while equality arguments do not.
i. Serrano v. Priest
While the Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez was the point of tran-
sition from federal courts to state courts for most plaintiffs, some plain-
tiffs, tired of equality "with all deliberate speed," moved to state courts
prior to Rodriguez. Serrano v. Priest exemplifies what happened when
equality arguments moved to state courts. In the late 1960s, plaintiffs
representing students and their parents brought a class action in the Cali-
fornia courts against state and county officials charged with administering
the financing of the public school system, alleging that "[a]s a direct result
of the financing scheme[,] substantial disparities in the quality and extent
of availability of educational opportunities exist . . . [and] [t]he educa-
tional opportunities made available to... plaintiff children[ ] are substan-
tially inferior to the educational opportunities made available to children
attending public schools in many other districts .... ',69 The plaintiffs
requested a declaration that the financing system was unconstitutional
under the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and
the California constitution.70 They made clear equality arguments-they
received less education money than other children-but this argument
was also based on a concept of adequacy because in order to argue that
equality would lead to fairness, plaintiffs first had to make the determina-
tion that the "equal" education was the education they wanted.
Looking at the plaintiffs' equal protection and due process arguments,
the court simultaneously analyzed them for violations of both the United
67. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249-53 (Cal. 1971).
68. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief of Plaintiffs at
25-26, Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2000), available at http://
www.decentschools.org/courtdocs/OlFirstAmendedComplaint.pdf.




States Constitution and the California constitution.7 The court first held
that wealth defines a suspect class and, therefore, classifications resting
on wealth are subject to strict scrutiny.72 It found that the school financ-
ing system irrefutably classified on the basis of wealth.73 Second, the
court looked at the nature of the right to an education and found that
"the distinctive and priceless function of education in our society war-
rants, indeed compels, our treating it as a 'fundamental interest.' ,74 Sub-
jecting the funding system to strict scrutiny, the court found that it was
not necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest and that it denied
plaintiffs and the rest of their class equal protection of the law.75 While
the court did not issue an order to the state, it remanded the case with
instructions to enforce a judgment implementing a transition from an un-
constitutional system to a constitutional one if the trial court found the
public school financing system invalid in whole or in part.76
Although the court did not define the remedy beyond a constitutional
funding system, its reliance on spending and funding disparities to reach
its holding suggests that this decision essentially set an equal funding
standard. The court took the equal protection arguments the plaintiffs
made and interpreted them to require horizontal equality but not vertical
equity. The decision in Serrano makes it clear, contrary to what Koski
and Reich argue, that equality cases do not necessarily create equity. Un-
like Robinson I,77 decided at nearly the same time, the Serrano court did
not recognize that some students may require more than "equal" or that
the state funding mechanism could be fair if it gave those students more.
Because the court relied on plaintiffs' claims of equal protection, the
71. Id. at 1249 n.ll (noting that the equal protection provisions of the two constitu-
tions are substantially equal in protections granted and, so, the same analysis can be used
for both). This dual analysis allowed the decision in Serrano to stand even after the deci-
sion in Rodriguez.
72. Id. at 1250.
73. Id. In making this determination, the court rejected the defendants' arguments
that (1) the financial system did not discriminate on the basis of wealth, (2) the figures used
by the court did not correctly assess wealth of a district or its residents, (3) the problem was
with the tax rate, and (4) discrimination on the basis of "wealth is constitutional so long as
the wealth is that of the district, not the individual." Id. at 1250-53. The court determined
that the primary determination of a district's wealth should not be the value of the prop-
erty, "but the ratio of its resources to pupils," as this figure is what determines what
amount a district can allocate to the education of its individual students. Id. at 1251.
74. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1258.
75. Id. at 1263; cf. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 303 A.2d 273, 287 (N.J. 1973)
(analyzing plaintiffs' claim on the basis of New Jersey's constitutional education guarantee,
rather than on equal protection grounds).
76. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1266.
77. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). See discussion in Part
III(C)(i) of this Note.
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court maintained the language of "equality" and did not consider the con-
cept of equity.
78
ii. Williams v. California
While Serrano shows that equality suits do not always have the ability
to achieve equity, Williams v. California shows that adequacy suits always
have the potential to do so. Plaintiffs in Williams filed a claim against the
State of California, the state superintendant of public education, the state
department of education, and the state board of education, alleging that
"[n]otwithstanding the [s]tate's assumption of responsibility for some as-
pects of public education, it has abdicated its responsibility to oversee
and superintend the constitutional functioning to ensure that all ... chil-
dren receive a free and equal common education."79 Plaintiffs contended
that they were required to attend schools that were without basic educa-
tional tools, such as pencils, crayons, paper, and scissors, that they had
grossly underprepared and inexperienced teachers, and that they had to
attend schools in "slum conditions" that were unsafe and overcrowded
and would "shock any reasonable conscience."8° Therefore, they argued,
they were deprived of the "free and common" education guaranteed by
the California constitution, while other students in other neighborhoods
received the constitutional guarantee. 81
Plaintiffs requested that the court issue a temporary restraining order,
a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction ordering the de-
fendants to "establish baseline standards to constitute a floor of minimal
constitutional conditions and tools essential for education"; "establish a
system of statewide accountability" to ensure that the state would be no-
tified of the absence of such tools and conditions and order the repair of
such problems or the supply of such tools; and "provide basic educational
78. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1258.
79. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief of Plaintiffs at 8,
Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2000), available at http://
www.decentschools.org/courtdocs/OlFirstAmendedComplaint.pdf.
80. Id. at 9, 25. Additionally, "[i]n at least [one hundred] schools in the [s]tate, as few
as [fifty] percent, sometimes as few as [thirteen] percent, of the teachers in a school [had]
full, nonemergency teaching credentials." Id. at 9.
81. Id. at 8-10. Interestingly, Koski and Reich state that "[i]mages of children in
crumbling schools with no textbooks and incompetent teachers outrage onlookers," which
cannot be entirely true, seeing as these children were in schools that had been crumbling
for years and little had been done to fix the problems. William S. Koski & Rob Reich,
When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It
Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 561 (2006).
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necessities to all California public school children."8 2 While this argu-
ment at first could be seen as creating a very low baseline above which
inequities would be tolerated, the way in which the plaintiffs structured
the remedies belies this interpretation. The minimum the plaintiffs asked
for is, in fact, the education that the state should aim to provide all stu-
dents, including concepts of equity.
The Williams plaintiffs argued that an adequate education begins with
an adequate supply of instructional materials, safe and clean facilities,
and qualified teachers.83 This definition is a minimum of what constitutes
an adequate school in which children have the opportunity to learn. But
this minimum is based on a concept of equality. It is clear that these
factors are always present in "good" schools; in fact, it is widely agreed
that such factors are necessary components of any sort of education.
What the Williams plaintiffs asked for was not the bare minimum educa-
tion (although it could be interpreted that way), but rather the required
components of an education. They did not ask for just any components,
but did ask for the three that could be construed as sine qua nons for a
school to provide an education meeting the demands of the modern
world.' If a fully qualified teacher taught in a classroom located in a
clean school with sufficient materials to meet the state standards and in
which children felt safe, it is likely that educational equality would be a
goal within reach of most of the students at the school. If, in fact, the
resources were provided in full and equity remained out of reach, the
settlement in Williams does not preclude plaintiffs from redefining the
resources, measuring what is needed by how far the school remains from
equity. While, as discussed below, the Williams plaintiffs might have
achieved greater equity if they had more carefully phrased the relief
sought, their petition was a step in the direction of equity.
There was no court decision issued in Williams because the parties set-
tled in 2004.85 The resulting settlement agreement (the Agreement) af-
fected all schools in California (with the greatest impact on decile 1-3
schools)86 and granted the plaintiffs nearly everything that was requested
82. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief of Plaintiffs at
74-75, Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 2000), available at http://
www.decentschools.orglcourtdocs/OlFirstAmendedComplaint.pdf.
83. Id. at 6.
84. In order to arrive at these resources, they would have to look at higher-perform-
ing schools and make comparisons, which infuses equality into the adequacy claim, as well
as equity.
85. The Williams Case-An Explanation, http://www.cde.ca.gov/eo/ce/wc/wmslaw-
suit.asp (last visited Dec. 22, 2009).
86. Deciles 1-3 refers to the school's academic performance index score (API), which
is based on student performance on the California Standards Test.
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in their original petition.87 The Agreement required the state to imple-
ment legislation to provide financial assistance to repair low-performing
schools; create a facilities assessment program; create and post in all
classrooms standards for instructional materials and facilities; collect and
verify data on compliance with those standards, as well as teacher re-
quirements; require a uniform process for complaints on anything failing
to meet those standards; require the ending of the Concept 6 calendar;88
intervene in decile 1-3 schools where the standards were not met, as well
as in districts having difficulty in attracting, retaining, or properly as-
signing teachers; improve the teacher supply by streamlining require-
ments for out-of-state teachers to earn California credentials; require
each district to implement a facilities inspection system; and put addi-
tional schools in the High Priority Schools Grant Program after others
were phased.89 In addition, the Agreement contained legislative propos-
als to provide substantial funding for those programs.90
While the Agreement affected all public schools in California, thereby
creating horizontal equality, it certainly did not "tolerate inequalities
above basic thresholds" or fail to "target additional resources to the de-
monstrably needy."9 The Agreement included certain provisions for
decile 1-3 schools alone, thus, creating a framework for vertical equity as
well.92 The High Priority Schools Grant Program is available only for
87. See Notice of Proposed Settlement at 6-7, Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2004), available at http://www.decentschools.org/settlement/wil-
liamsnotice_settlement.pdf (listing the terms of the proposed settlement). The Agree-
ment provides for legislative proposals that will ensure students have clean and safe
schools, books, and qualified teachers, as well as measures to ensure that schools maintain
the availability of such fundamental elements and funding for educational programs. Id. at
6.
88. The Concept 6 calendar was created for schools in California that enrolled more
than 150% capacity. Jeannie Oakes & Martin Lipton, "Schools That Shock the Con-
science": Williams v. California and the Struggle for Education on Equal Terms Fifty Years
After Brown, 19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 353, 361 (2004). The schedule accommodates
three revolving tracks of students by cutting seventeen days from the school year. Id. Al-
most all of the Concept 6 schools are located in Los Angeles Unified District and have
twice as many Latino students as schools not using a Concept 6 calendar. Id. In addition,
all Concept 6 schools are located in low-income neighborhoods. Id.
89. Notice of Proposed Settlement at 7, Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2004), available at http://www.decentschools.org/settlement/williams-
noticesettlement.pdf.
90. Id. at 8.
91. William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat from Equity
in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 571 (2006).
92. Notice of Proposed Settlement at 7, Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal.




decile 1-3 schools, as are the intervention programs.93 In addition, some
of the resources that are available to all schools disproportionately affect
decile 1-3 schools in a way that aids the decile 1-3 schools without also
disadvantaging them in relation to the decile 4-10 schools.94 For example,
the increased monitoring of teacher qualifications for classrooms with
twenty or more English Language Learners (ELLs) will most affect
schools that have high percentages of those students. Because ELLs
tended to be concentrated in decile 1-3 schools,95 this strategy will ensure
that they are provided a higher quality of teachers and will bring them
closer to the standards met in other schools. This is also true in relation to
the Concept 6 calendar; because that calendar was implemented almost
exclusively in higher poverty areas where the schools tended to be lower-
performing, aiming the correction at all schools really only aided decile 1-
3 schools.9 6 The ability of these added resources to compensate only the
low-performing schools increases both horizontal and vertical equity.
While Williams has equity-minded aspects, it did not go far enough to
achieve full equity, and there are ways in which it could have taken the
adequacy definition further towards equity. For example, Williams could
have required that decile 1-3 schools get money for instructional materi-
als beyond textbooks, including other books and supplementary pro-
grams and materials, even though other schools do not get such
supplementary materials from the state. This would be equity-minded
because test scores in decile 1-3 schools demonstrate that these students
are generally far behind their peers in other schools and, so, are likely to
need additional help and multi-leveled material.97 Therefore, the extra
resources would be directed to where there was a specific need. In addi-
tion, understanding that the students in decile 1-3 schools often begin
school behind their peers, the Williams court, like the Abbott court, could
have required preschool programs.98 While no one can legitimately ex-
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Jeannie Oakes & Martin Lipton, "Schools That Shock the Conscience": Williams v.
California and the Struggle for Education on Equal Terms Fifty Years After Brown, 19
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 353, 361 (2004).
96. Id.
97. See DataQuest (CA Dept of Education), http://dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/ (last vis-
ited Dec. 31, 2009) (providing test scores for California public schools). Searching Data-
Quest at the District Level for STAR test scores, when narrowed to Los Angeles Unified
School District, Decile 1-3 schools (e.g., Samuel Gompers Middle School and Fremont
Senior High School), will demonstrate the lower test scores for decile 1-3 students. The
search results can also be limited by year (before or after the Williams decision) and to
demonstrate graduation rates.
98. This would require plaintiffs and courts to do what Koski and Reich say they do
not: "compare the resources of poor children to those of the affluent." William S. Koski &
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pect a lawsuit to remedy all of the inequities in education, a more com-
plete definition of "adequate" could have resolved more of the problems
and, thus, could have been more equitable. But the fact that Williams
could have included those factors is a clear sign that adequacy suits have
the potential to achieve equity.
C. New Jersey
As in California, two cases in New Jersey have impacted education in
that state. Unlike California, however, both cases were brought under
the New Jersey education clause's guarantee of a "thorough and effi-
cient" education. The first, Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I)," marked
the first time plaintiffs used the education article rather than the equal
protection clause of the state constitution to bring their claims. Robinson
I clearly indicates that while plaintiffs were trying a new tactic, they were
continually asking for equity. The second case, Abbott v. Burke (Abbott
I), ° continued the fight for equity after Robinson I failed in implemen-
tation and in remedying inequities. Abbott I demonstrates that over
nearly thirty years of litigation and considerable frustration with failures
of implementation, plaintiffs have yet to give up on the concept of equity
in favor of something "easier."
i. Robinson v. Cahill
Just as in California, advocates in New Jersey wanted more than what
the U.S. Supreme Court's education decisions provided them. In 1973,
students attending schools in property-poor districts in New Jersey
brought an action challenging the state's funding system for public
schools.10' The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the funding scheme
violated the state constitution's guarantee of a "thorough and efficient"
education.' 0 2 The court defined a "thorough and efficient" education as
one that provides equal educational opportunities for all children such
that each child is equipped both as a citizen and as a competitor upon
Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law and Pol-
icy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 569 (2006). When courts demand that the state
give resources to poorer districts even though wealthier districts do not get them, they
make comparisons and look at what is lacking in the schools and the lives of the poorer
children and how to remedy that disparity. See discussion of Abbott V in Part IlI(C)(ii)(b)
of this Note.
99. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson I), 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). See discussion in Part
II(C)(i) of this Note.
100. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 495 A.2d 376 (N.J 1985). See discussion in Part
III(C)(ii) of this Note.
101. Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 276.
102. Id. at 294.
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entering the working world.10 3 While the claim was based on a concept
of adequacy, the language with which the court defined the requirement
is clearly one based both on equality and equity. While "thorough and
efficient" could have been interpreted as requiring the basic or the bare
minimum of education, what emerged was a requirement for equality and
equity. The court stated that each child would need to be equipped for
the world, something that is only possible if fairness is taken into account.
These concepts would have been unavailable if the switch from equity to
adequacy had, in fact, been complete and distinct.
The concepts of equality and equity are also present in the remedy the
court ordered. The court found that funding equality and educational
equality, or what I would term "equity," were not the same and, there-
fore, did not require equal funding, thereby allowing New Jersey to con-
stitutionally "recognize differences in area costs, or a need for additional
dollar input to equip classes of disadvantaged children for the educational
opportunity."'' °4 The court, therefore, required that New Jersey "cost
out" a constitutionally guaranteed education and base its funding scheme
on the application of the costing out plan. At the end of the decision in
Robinson I, the court firmly required equity as a result of the adequacy
case, which is clear from the fact that the court recognized that some
children may need more resources than others and that "equal" would
not suffice.' 0 5
But when the case returned to court because of the state legislature's
failure to act, the court reframed its opinion in equality terms, requiring
equal dollar input per pupil.'0 6 In Robinson IV, adequacy did not require
a minimum level of funding or an equitable level of funding; it required
an equal level of funding."0 7 This remedy required horizontal equality-
that is, the same treatment of all students, regardless of the school or the
neighborhood they live in. Koski and Reich contend that while horizon-
tal equality is the first step, it still allows for inequalities above the base-
line."0 8 Equal resources simply cannot result in an equal "opportunity" at
103. Id. at 295 ("The Constitution's guarantee must be understood to embrace that
educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for
his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market."). This definition encapsulates
the definition of "equity" used in this Note.
104. Id. at 297-98.
105. Robinson I is somewhat of a hybrid case. The plaintiffs made their arguments
under the education clause of the New Jersey constitution, so, in that way, it was an ade-
quacy case. But the remedy was framed in terms of equality of funding, which is more
often associated with the earlier equality cases.
106. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson IV), 351 A.2d 713, 721-22 (N.J. 1975).
107. Id.
108. William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't. The Retreat from Equity
in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 549 (2006).
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high school graduation because some schools require more resources in
order to achieve that outcome for their students. As the Robinson I deci-
sion demonstrated, however, adequacy suits have the ability to move be-
yond horizontal equality toward vertical equity (i.e., achievement of the
high school standards) when courts recognize that the litigants require
more in order to meet the constitutional guarantee.
ii. Abbott v. Burke
The decision in Robinson I and the New Jersey legislature's enactment
of the Public School Education Act of 1975 promised the plaintiffs and
those like them an education equal to what their wealthier peers re-
ceived.109 That promise went unfulfilled and, less than ten years later,
new plaintiffs again went to the New Jersey courts to demand the educa-
tion they were guaranteed." 0
While the cases known collectively as the Abbott litigation have been
going on for nearly thirty years, it is not necessary to review all of the
decisions to understand how the concept of equity informed the adequacy
claim and made it stronger. In this part I present the plaintiffs' original
adequacy arguments from Abbott I to demonstrate how these arguments
used equity, but I look only at the decisions in Abbott H111 and Abbott
V' 12 because those two decisions demonstrate how the concept of ade-
quacy continually requires the consideration of equity and how "ade-
quacy-as-equity" can be maintained and changed with time and
circumstances.
a. Abbott I and Abbott H
The Abbott litigation shows how plaintiffs construct arguments about
adequacy and how those constructions are informed by equity." 3 In Ab-
109. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 355 A.2d 129, 132 (N.J. 1976) (stating that
"[tihe goal of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools shall be to provide to
all children in New Jersey, regardless of socioeconomic status or geographic location, the
educational opportunity which will prepare them to function politically, economically and
socially in a democratic society" (citation omitted)).
110. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 495 A.2d 376, 382-83 (N.J. 1985). The plaintiffs
contended that, while the act was found under Robison V to be facially constitutional if
fully funded, it was unconstitutional as applied. Id. The plaintiffs argued that such uncon-
stitutionality was evidenced by the "excessive" disparities that still continued in school
funding under the act. Id.
111. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). See discussion in Part
l1(C)(ii)(a) of this Note.
112. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998). See discussion in Part
III(C)(ii)(b) of this Note.
113. William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat from Equity
in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 570 (2006).
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bott I, plaintiffs argued that sizeable property wealth disparities among
school districts resulted in substantial disparities in the amount of money
spent per pupil and that the unavailability of financial resources in their
school districts deprived them of the "thorough and efficient education"
guaranteed by the New Jersey constitution. 14 Plaintiffs presented infor-
mation showing inadequacies in the following areas: "adequacy of in-
struction, the breadth of program offerings, the adequacy of programs
and services for children with special educational needs, the quality of
physical facilities and materials and supplies, the qualifications of school
personnel, the effectiveness of administration, and the adequacy of evalu-
ation and monitoring programs. '' 115 They introduced the state education
board's records into evidence to show that children in districts like their
own learned significantly less, using state standardized test scores and the
disproportionally large dropout rate as the measures of the lack of educa-
tional success in the schools they attended. 1 6
The Abbott I plaintiffs defined the harm both in terms of the inputs
(the missing programs) and the outputs (the test scores and the dropout
rate)." While it might be argued that plaintiffs' focus on the missing
resources makes this an adequacy claim that has dropped the concept of
equity, both the process of defining the claim and the reliance upon out-
put disproves this argument. Plaintiffs are only able to define what re-
sources are "missing" by what is present in other locations and schools.
Therefore, they requested horizontal equality by asking for those re-
sources. While test scores are often questioned for their effectiveness in
measuring learning, they are an excellent means of comparison because
they are curved through a state to define the level of proficiency."1 8 The
fact that the Abbott I plaintiffs went to school in locations where test
scores were far below the norm shows a lack of vertical equity, which
plaintiffs attempted to remedy and used as the indicator of the effective-
ness of resource provision. By combining the push for horizontal equality
with a means by which to measure vertical equity, the plaintiffs, in fact,
made an equity claim, although they framed it in terms of adequacy and
equality. In essence, they began with the assumption that equal resources
would lead to equal proficiency; only later would this be called into
question.
114. Abbott 1, 495 A.2d at 381.
115. Id. at 383-84.
116. Id. at 384.
117. Id.
118. While Koski and Reich argue that Abbott did not initially include the concept of
"adequacy," I argue that it necessarily did because the plaintiffs relied on the failure to
meet proficiency to demonstrate the failure of the funding system.
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The court in Abbott H maintained the connection between adequacy
and equity in its decision. The court found that "rt]he inadequacy of
poorer urban students' present education measured against their needs is
glaring. Whatever the cause, these school districts are failing abysmally,
dramatically, and tragically. '"' 19 The court set a remedy that required ei-
ther the amendment of the Public School Education Act of 1975 or the
passing of new legislation to ensure (at a constant, year-to-year) that the
Abbott districts' funding was "substantially equal to that of property-rich
districts" or to those that provided the type of educational instruction the
students needed.12° While recognizing that the failures of the school dis-
tricts might be related to factors outside of the funding issues and that
money was not the entire cure, the court found that the districts were
"entitled to pass or fail with at least the same amount of money as their
competitors."
12 1
While measuring the concept of adequacy, the court included discus-
sion and remedies meant to address both equality and equity. First, the
court defined the remedy as funding that is "substantially equal" to that
of districts that provide the kind of education the students require, thus,
creating a system of horizontal equality.' 22 Second, while the court set
the remedy by establishing an external comparison, it also made two
moves that established a framework for vertical equity. The first move
was to measure the lacking resources against the needs of the students.' 23
This step allows for vertical equity because it leaves room for the argu-
ment that some students have greater needs than others and, therefore,
the resources provided should reflect that fact. The second step was to
limit the remedy to poorer urban school districts, allowing for the provi-
sion of additional resources to some schools (which creates vertical eq-
uity) instead of a provision to all schools (which might simply raise the
bar while maintaining the inequalities). 24
b. Abbott V: "The crisis is obvious; the solutions are
",125elusive.
Abbott V most clearly demonstrates how the courts can use an "ade-
quacy-as-equity" framework to create equality and remedy inequalities
above the baseline. In Abbott V, the New Jersey Supreme Court ad-
dressed reforms and remedial programs that were proposed as a result of
119. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 366 (N.J. 1990).
120. Id. at 408.
121. Id. at 403.
122. Id. at 408.
123. Id. at 403.
124. Abbott II, 575 A.2d at 403.
125. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450, 527 (N.J. 1998).
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the court's order in Abbott /V. 126 The court created a comprehensive and
detailed plan-including both funding and resources-for how the state
and districts would comply with Abbott 11.127 In elementary schools, the
reforms included the following: restructuring of elementary schools
through whole-school reform models; full-day kindergarten; half-day pre-
school for three- and four-year-olds; and reduced class sizes. 128 In the
middle and high schools, the reforms included: remedial education pro-
grams; dropout prevention counselors; school-to-work or college transi-
tion programs; full-time security personnel; metal detectors; and the
establishment of codes of conduct. 129 At all levels, the programs in-
cluded: health and social support services; comprehensive teacher profes-
sional development; increased use of instructional technology, including
two media-technology coordinators at the seventh- through twelfth-grade
levels; and transition to school-based decision-making and "educationally
adequate facilities.' 130
While pieces of the remedy are aimed at horizontal equality, the rem-
edy overall is aimed at vertical equity and, thus, equality of educational
opportunity, rather than equality of resources. Some of the resources are
those found at any school in the state: qualified and trained teachers, use
of instructional technology, smaller class sizes, and adequate facilities.
Providing just those resources would make the Abbott districts "equal" to
the other districts. But because of factors outside of the education system
that can affect educational opportunity, the court went beyond these
minimums to require more than what schools in other districts provided,
in effect, creating a new inequality, but one designed to funnel resources
to those most in need. Because parents in other districts had the ability
to provide preschool education, under Abbott, the state would provide it.
And because the Abbott plaintiffs and those like them were often behind
when they reached middle and high school, the court mandated remedial
programs and tutoring services even though no evidence was introduced
that these resources were present at other schools.13 1 The same was also
true for the security personnel, dropout counselors, and transition pro-
grams.1 32 In Abbott V, the court, using the concept of adequacy, looked
126. Id. In Abbott IV, the court ordered the state to "study, identify, fund, and imple-
ment supplemental programs required to redress the disadvantages of public school chil-
dren" in Abbott schools so that a more specific remedy could be granted. Abbott v. Burke
(Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417, 421 (N.J. 1997) (emphasis added).
127. Abbott V, 710 A.2d at 454.
128. Id. at 486-89.
129. Id. at 494-95.
130. Id. at 491-92, 495, 523.
131. Id. at 494-95.
132. Abbott V, 710 A.2d at 494-95.
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at what programs and resources would create equality of opportunity, or
"equity," through horizontal inequality.133 This decision lessened the
likelihood that any advancements in Abbott districts would be counter-
acted by equal advancements in non-Abbott districts and, therefore, was
able to account for relative deprivation.
IV. CHANGING THE LANGUAGE, CHANGING THE OUTCOME: How
INSERTING EQUITY INTO THE DEBATE CAN AID
PLAINTIFF SUCCESS
While adequacy suits have the potential to guarantee equity, they have
not yet been successful in every state, leaving advocates frustrated and
many students receiving inequitable educations. I argue that the success
of many of these cases can be improved by carefully defining the concept
of "adequacy."
There are two ways in which adequacy suits have failed: in the first, the
courts stop success; in the second, implementation is stalled. Courts have
given essentially two justifications for denying relief in education cases.
In the first, the courts have found that the state provided a constitution-
ally guaranteed education despite disparities between districts. In the
second, the courts have refused to decide the issue at all, calling it a non-
justiciable question and, therefore, allowing the decisions of the legisla-
ture to stand. In subpart A below, I look at two cases to demonstrate
how using the "adequacy-as-equity" framework could have helped the
lawsuits in the first category succeed. In subpart B, I address how the
"adequacy-as-equity" framework may aid the latter scenario, though ly-
ing further from the scope of immediate litigation. Finally, in subpart C, I
address how equity can inform strategies for implementation to make
them more successful.
A. Interpreting the Language of the Education Clause
Each state constitution differs on the protection it affords education.
Getting courts to accept the construction of the protection that plaintiffs
advance is required for plaintiff success. In this subpart, looking at cases
from Oklahoma and Louisiana, I show how a concept of equity could
change the understanding of what the state constitution requires, thereby





While New Jersey has one clearly defined education requirement
("thorough and efficient"), 134 Oklahoma has a number of statutory prin-
ciples and provisions that refer to the quality of the required education.
This makes litigation trickier because it requires interpretation of a
greater number of phrases, each of which can modify the others. In 1987,
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma rejected challenges to the constitution-
ality of Oklahoma's public school financing system.135 The challenge was
brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, as well as the Oklahoma constitution's due process clause and spe-
cific education provisions.' 36 The plaintiffs argued that "the disparities in
taxable wealth among the various school districts" and the fiscal impact
of those disparities on spending power affected the "ability of the poorer
districts to provide their students with educational resources and oppor-
tunities comparable to those of the more affluent school districts." '137
The court pointed to several factors in rejecting the plaintiffs' argu-
ments. First, that the plaintiffs had not alleged that they had "been abso-
lutely denied a free public education, nor that they [were] not receiving an
adequate one... [but] only that they [were] not able to provide as much
money per pupil as do other districts."'138 Second, that language in the
Oklahoma school code, which provided, in pertinent part, that Oklahoma
would "provide the best possible educational opportunities for every
child in Oklahoma" and that the system must "assure that state and local
funds are adequate for the support of a realistic foundation program,"
was not meant to require funding equalization.1 39 Third, and lastly, the
court stated that the right guaranteed in Oklahoma's education article
was a "basic, adequate education according to the standards established
by the [s]tate [b]oard of [e]ducation," which was not synonymous with
equal expenditures.
141
The "adequacy-as-equity" framework can address each of those three
points in a way that could lead to a better result for plaintiffs. First, in an
adequacy suit, the plaintiffs, while still not asserting complete denial of
134. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 367 (N.J 1990).
135. Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 746 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Okla.
1987).
136. Id. at 1143-50. The challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment is a strange
challenge to bring after the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez, and the Oklahoma
Supreme Court's dismissal of the claim is likely to be repeated in any state court where a
similar claim is brought.
137. Id. at 1137.
138. Id. at 1146 (emphases in original).
139. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 18-101 (2005)).
140. Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc., 746 P.2d at 1149 (emphasis omitted).
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education, assert claims of inadequacy. 4 1 The Oklahoma Supreme Court
implicitly rejected the idea that equality is equivalent to adequacy or eq-
uity; reframing the claim as one involving lack of specific resources re-
quired for adequacy, rather than lack of equal expenditures, would force
the court to acknowledge that funding is directly related to adequacy.
14 2
The fact that the court did not want to accept the idea that funding equal-
ity and educational equity are the same can be turned into a benefit, as it
was in Robinson. If the plaintiffs framed this case in terms of inadequate
resources and inequitable outcomes, it seems likely that some of the
court's reasoning on this point would have been moot. This is clear from
another section of the opinion in which the court denies the claim based
on the fact that there was no showing that children were not receiving at
least a basic, adequate education; such a claim is a necessary part of an
adequacy suit.
In each of the three issues discussed above, inserting the "adequacy-as-
equity" framework would assist the plaintiffs. While the first issue sup-
ports the bringing of an adequacy suit over an equality suit, the other
issues explain why the concept of equity is important. When the
Oklahoma Supreme Court interprets the language of the state constitu-
tion, it is interpreting the second and third issues in the absence of the
concept of equity. If the plaintiffs could construct the complaint to argue
for interpretation in light of equity concerns, the decision might shift to
the plaintiffs. While the best possible educational opportunity is a neces-
sarily high standard, the court relies more on the language of the guiding
principle-that funds must be "adequate for the support of a realistic
foundation program" 14 3-which brings down the standard.
But the idea of adequacy can inform what "realistic foundation" means
so that the high standard of "best possible educational opportunity" re-
mains. The goal of equity can then inform the definition of "adequate"
and "realistic" so as to require the resources necessary to attain the high
achievement standard. For example, if "adequate" is defined in light of
real educational requirements necessary to compete in a modern world
and "realistic" is related to the resources the state could make available
to reach that goal, the court would be forced to confront the disparity
between the promise and the actuality. Inserting the concept of equity
into litigation would allow the court to make the transition from the origi-
nal interpretation to this one. These same arguments also respond to the
court's denial of an equality remedy or, alternatively, make that remedy
moot. While no one can predict with certainty how the court might rule
141. Id. at 1137.
142. Id. at 1146.
143. Id. (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 18-101 (2005) (emphasis added)).
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in a new case, inserting equity into the debate has the potential to change
the outcome because it speaks directly to the court's reasoning.
ii. Louisiana
Louisiana's constitution offers little protection for education, requiring
only that a "minimum" of education be provided.144 While this has
stalled the success of previous adequacy suits and, therefore, prevented
equity from advancing in past litigation, I believe that the "adequacy-as-
equity" framework could aid success in Louisiana as well.
In Charlet v. Legislature of the State of Louisiana, brought in 1992, the
Orleans Parish School Board and a group of parents sued Louisiana, ar-
guing that the state "was not fulfilling its responsibility to provide a mini-
mum foundation of education to all children . . . as required by the
Louisiana [c]onstitution, and that the [s]tate's failure to equitably allocate
funding for the schools violated the plaintiffs' constitutional right to equal
educational opportunity under the law."' 45 A similar suit filed on the
same day argued that specified deficiencies in public school resources and
achievement demonstrated the state's failure to meet the constitutional
guarantees. 146 In 1998, the Louisiana court of appeals rejected the plain-
tiffs' claims, finding that the state's minimum foundation program (MFP),
which allocated funds to the school districts, did not violate the plaintiffs'
equal protection rights and that the constitutional guarantee of a "mini-
mum foundation of education" meant nothing more than the least that
could be provided where "minimum" meant "the least quantity assigna-
ble, admissible or possible in a given case.'
147
The first part of the court's finding is interesting because it demon-
strates the potential for equity concerns even though the court ultimately
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 148 The decision
regarding the MFP essentially rests on the fact that the state's expert had
testified that the MFP formula was specifically designed to eliminate pre-
vious disparities by distributing relatively less money to wealthier districts
than to poorer districts.1 49 This suggests that the court was swayed by
equity concepts even as it rejected the equal protection challenge. There-
144. Charlet v. Legislature, 713 So. 2d 1199, 1203 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting LA.
CONST. art VIII, § 13(B)).
145. Id. at 1200.
146. Id. at 1200-01 (noting the suit brought against the state on the same day by the
Minimum Foundation Commission and parents of students).
147. Id. at 1206.
148. Id.
149. Charlet, 713 So. 2d at 1207.
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fore, bringing an adequacy suit informed by equity has the potential of
changing the decision.
150
Adequacy and equity can be inserted into the debate regarding the in-
terpretation of what the Louisiana constitution requires by the phrase
"minimum foundation." In Charlet, the court found that "minimum"
meant the least that could be provided such that no less would be possible
to provide.151 This construction of the words of the education statute at
first appears to foreclose the provision of additional resources beyond
what the bare minimum would be. But looking at the definition the court
adopts-"the least quantity assignable, admissible or possible in a given
case" 15 2-there is the possibility to expand the term "minimum founda-
tion." On its face, the court's conclusion suggests that Louisiana could do
even less than it is now doing; that implicitly sets a lower boundary, possi-
bly somewhere around the ability to recite the alphabet. What adequacy
suits, however, do is force courts to consider a more realistic definition of
"minimum"-that without which a student would be unprepared for the
modern world.
While the idea of the "least quantity" is nearly impossible to avoid in
light of the language of the Louisiana constitution, the remainder of the
Charlet court's definition makes that idea susceptible to adequacy and
equity expansions. In order to determine what is "assignable" and "pos-
sible," there must be a determination of what would be required to meet
the goal and a balance of those resources against funding. The idea of
adequacy can elevate the idea of what is required to meet the goal, and
equity can inform the idea of possibility. After all, if it is possible to give
certain students some things to reach a goal, it is possible to give others
those things as well. The plaintiffs in the related suit began this process
when they asserted that conditions were poor in their schools. But they
did not appear to tie these problems to the idea of what was needed,
assignable, or possible, which must be done to get around the court's re-
jection of the idea.
Equity can inform the idea of admissibility as well. If a goal is estab-
lished (e.g., the Louisiana state education standards), then students must
have certain things to reach that goal. Equity can inform this process so
150. In 2005, the plaintiffs filed another suit in Louisiana alleging that the funding
system violated the minimum guarantee by failing to include cost analysis in the funding
formula and that facilities were inadequate, deteriorating, and unsafe. Jones v. State
Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE), 927 So. 2d 426, 428 (La. Ct. App.
2005). The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants in that case and the
appeals court affirmed. Id. The claims made in this case are different from those I ad-
vance here.




that it becomes permissible to give certain students more than others in
order to reach that goal. This is not equality; it is giving to each the re-
sources essential to meet the state mandate, something that the Louisiana
Supreme Court appears to support in its discussion of the funding mecha-
nism. By inserting adequacy and equity language into the debate over
what the language of the Louisiana education clauses require, the court
would be challenged to face the implications of its own reasoning in light
of the actual needs of students today.
B. Questions of Justiciability
There are a few states in which defendants have won, almost by de-
fault, because the courts have decided that the issue of education funding
and adequacy are non-justiciable and that, therefore, the decisions made
by the legislature should stand. A decision of non-justiciability stalls the
action completely. But there is a way to use the "adequacy-as-equity"
framework to try to demonstrate justiciability, as well as to act outside of
the court and try to make changes through the political process. As an
example, I consider a case from Pennsylvania.
In 1979, just after the California and New Jersey courts upheld chal-
lenges to state education funding systems on equality and adequacy
grounds, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to do the same, finding
in Danson v. Casey that the plaintiffs had failed to state a justiciable
cause of action." 3 In 1998 in Marrero v. Pennsylvania, the Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania, relying on Danson, held that challenges to
the adequacy of funding provided under the statutory scheme posed a
non-justiciable question. 154 The court stated that the history of public
schools in Pennsylvania demonstrated that the legislature had created the
schools as integral parts of the state's governmental system. 155 As a re-
sult, the court determined that the state's power over education was a
153. 399 A.2d 360, 367 (Pa. 1979). There are a number of explanations for why the
Pennsylvania court rejected plaintiffs' claims when other courts were not doing the same.
The rejection of the claim is especially interesting when one considers that the language of
the Pennsylvania education clause is identical to New Jersey's, and the New Jersey court
clearly found the concept justiciable. See discussion of the Abbott litigation in Part III(C)
of this Note, above. One explanation may be that the Pennsylvania court, watching the
action in nearby New Jersey, was reticent to dive into the fray.
154. 709 A.2d 956, 965 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998). Just as in Danson, the proximity to
New Jersey may help explain why the court, when faced with a different question, chose to
decline to decide. By 1998, the Pennsylvania courts would have watched the New Jersey
Supreme Court exercise substantial power over issues of education without clear benefit to
the students or to the power of the courts. Pennsylvania may have been reluctant to open
itself up to the same.
155. Id. at 961.
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fundamental power of the government.156 The court read the state con-
stitution as placing an affirmative duty on the Pennsylvania legislature to
provide a "thorough and efficient system of public schools," but not as
conferring on individual students the right to receive such an educa-
tion. 57 Finally, it held that it was unable to judicially define what consti-
tuted an "adequate" education and, therefore, would not question the
"reason, wisdom, or expediency of the legislative policy with regard to
education." '158
The issue raised by cases such as Marrero is more difficult than that
raised in cases in which the courts have simply interpreted the language
in a way unfavorable to the plaintiffs. But this does not mean that plain-
tiffs are without recourse or that the "adequacy-as-equity" framework is
not helpful to them.159 There are essentially two options: first, reframe
the issue and try to bring it back into court; and second, take the fight out
of the courtroom and into the political sphere, maintaining the "ade-
quacy-as-equity" framework.
Starting with the former, it appears from the Pennsylvania court's anal-
ysis that that court might be more receptive to equity and equality con-
cerns than to adequacy concerns. Adequacy on its own, as discussed in
Part III above, is intentionally a concept without clear boundaries that
forces the courts to either construct the definition on their own or rely on
a party's proposed definition and constructions. While many courts have
done this, courts such as the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania have
been reluctant to do so. But equality is a concept with which courts are
familiar and one that is easy to define: one student should get what the
other does. Arguments for equality might advance the debate in courts.
This does not solve the problem though; equality is only half of the
battle because it does not get the plaintiffs to equity. Equity is less clearly
defined than equality, but it is more clearly defined than adequacy be-
cause it is a traditional legal concept familiar to courts and because there
are clear lines and statistical frameworks that can be used to guide the
definition. For example, if plaintiffs set the goal at high school profi-
ciency (as they have done in other cases) and use the mandated high-
156. Id.
157. Id. at 962 (emphasis in original).
158. Id. at 965. This is contrary to Koski's and Reich's statement that education arti-
cles are easier for courts to interpret than "elusive 'fundamental rights' and 'suspect clas-
ses. ' William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't: The Retreat from Equity in
Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 560 (2006).
159. While I do not intend this to be a complete list of the ways that advocates can
approach the education inequities in these states, this is an issue that requires more debate,




stakes test scores to measure the current gap between this goal and the
status quo, there would be a clear indication of what hurdle must be
cleared on the way to equity. Because education research has done the
work to determine what is needed to clear such hurdles, the courts would
rely on experts (not on ideas of their own) to construct what equity would
require. This approach makes the issue less subjective and more like
other issues courts are accustomed to evaluating.
If reconstructing the complaint does not get plaintiffs past the jus-
ticiability issue, the "adequacy-as-equity" framework can be used outside
of the courtroom as well. For example, advocates can use the initiative
process to expand the constitutional guarantee to give all children what
they require. 160 The adequacy and equity framework would need to be
employed in this process throughout, both to construct the language of
the initiative and to sway voters and legislatures to support such a goal.
In terms of construction, the initiative can do several things: for example,
it can change the language of the state education clause (e.g., from "mini-
mum" to "adequate"), or it can more specifically define the required edu-
cation (e.g., "The education provided by state x will include standards-
based textbooks, qualified teachers, and safe and clean environments").
The former is less likely to allow plaintiffs to get back into court in states
like Pennsylvania, but it does elevate the level required; if nothing else, it
may put pressure on the legislature to meet the new standard. The latter
is more easily judged under even a rational basis standard, but it runs the
risk of being so specific as to lose flexibility and require constant amend-
ments. However advocates decide to phrase the language, both what
would be equal and what would be equitable must be considered in order
not to generate still more inequities.
While "adequacy-as-equity" should also guide the campaign for such a
change, advocates must recognize that equity poses risks because if some-
one is getting more, others will necessarily get less. Therefore, the bar for
adequacy must be set high enough that parents are comfortable that their
own children will be protected. 16' Advocates must determine, based on
their own constituencies, how best to direct and frame this argument.
160. This would be easiest in states such as California where the initiative process can
be used to amend the state constitution. See, e.g., Access Quality Education: Florida Liti-
gation Historical Background, http://www.schoolfunding.info/states/fl/lit fl.php3 (last vis-
ited Dec. 22, 2009) (showing how Florida education advocates used the state's initiative
and referendum process to strengthen the state's education clause). The new language of
Florida's constitution "makes Florida's education clause one of the most strongly worded
in the nation." Id.
161. Koski and Reich argue that one of the things that have made adequacy suits
more palatable is that they do not "level down," but rather allow inequities above "ade-
quate." William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn't The Retreat from Equity in
[Vol, 12:403
ADEQUACY LITIGATION
C. Equity in Implementation
Much of the debate regarding adequacy and equality cases has cen-
tered around implementation, and I would argue that since no court deci-
sion or settlement has yet to be completely implemented, this is where it
should remain. But because the scholarship discussing implementation
has often focused on what would be adequate without any explicit discus-
sion of vertical equity, scholars' focus needs to shift to fit the framework I
have outlined. While I cannot address all the ways this might occur, I
offer three suggestions in this section to spark the debate on this topic.
First, implementation requires full knowledge of the problem and of
the available resources. Therefore, implementation strategies that focus
on only one of those factors at the expense of the others, such as Profes-
sor Kagan's push to focus on inputs alone,162 will not be sufficient to
achieve equity. This can be seen from the fact that while Williams has
been nearly fully implemented in some locations, there has been only a
slight rise in test scores and very little change in rankings, which are a
good judge of outcome equity because they are based on comparative
data.'63 A well-rounded implementation strategy would include the fol-
lowing: an educational component to inform stakeholders what they are
supposed to be provided; a complaint mechanism, backed by sanctions, to
Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J. 545, 591-92 (2006) (ex-
plaining that "leveling down" occurs when resources afforded to well-off districts are elimi-
nated in order to make those districts more on par with low-income districts, as opposed to
simply adding resources to low-income districts to enable them to "level up" to wealthier
districts). Even if adequacy suits are perceived thusly, they do not necessarily have this
effect. Id. If "adequate" is given a construction that levels it up to what is currently af-
forded to high-performing schools, neither the rich nor the poor suffer, and the claim may
still be more easily accepted. Id. at 590.
162. Josh Kagan, A Civics Action: Interpreting "Adequacy" in State Constitutions' Ed-
ucation Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2244 (2003).
163. Using data collected by the California Department of Education, it is possible to
compare the API scores and rankings of the schools mentioned in the Williams complaint.
See DataQuest (CA Dept of Education), http://dq.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/ (last visited Dec.
31, 2009) (providing test scores for California public schools).
The plaintiffs attended forty-six schools, twenty-six of which were located in the Greater
Bay Area and Los Angeles County. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declara-
tory Relief of Plaintiffs at 26-57, Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug.
14, 2000), available at http://www.decentschools.org/courtdocs/OlFirstAmendedCom-
plaint.pdf. Out of those twenty-six schools, all but four saw API scores rise at least slightly,
which may be attributable to Williams. But only two schools rose in ranking, and three of
the schools actually fell in ranking. In addition, all but two of the schools remain decile 1-3
schools. Thus, while the schools made progress, they remain at the bottom of the rankings
in California. In addition, in California the graduation rate is somewhere around seventy-




allow stakeholders to notify the appropriate agencies when required re-
sources are lacking; and monitoring of outputs to allow for adjustments
when the inputs do not have the desired and necessary effects.
Some of these factors are already present in successful cases. For ex-
ample, as Koski notes, Williams defined a complaint mechanism for
stakeholders to report lacking resources.' 64 But not all successful cases
have such a system, as demonstrated by Abbott's lack of any required
reporting mechanism. Even where some of the factors are present, others
are lacking. Williams is lacking the educational component, and many
stakeholders remain confused and unaware of what is required and how
they can effect change.165 The lack of an educational component makes
the complaint mechanism far less effective than it has the potential to be.
Finally, while both Abbott and Williams require monitoring of the re-
quired inputs (by the Education Law Center in New Jersey and the
ACLU of Southern California, respectively), neither case required that a
system be in place to monitor outputs, a factor that is required in order to
keep up with the constantly evolving definition of equity. Moreover,
both monitoring entities are, in effect, volunteers, rather than intrinsic
parts of the system as they should be; auditing is good business practice,
and designated internal auditors can identify problems before they be-
come serious enough to impact the classroom.
Second, even though many advocates and detractors have character-
ized adequacy suits as more palatable to society than the alternatives,
implementation often stalls because of societal resistance. "[U]rban
schools are fighting a battle they cannot win without strong support from
local, state, and federal political leaders, and from voters and taxpayers
outside the cities.",166 Because societal resistance is not something that
can be addressed in a lawsuit, litigation must be combined with policy
164. William S. Koski, Achieving "Adequacy" in the Classroom, 27 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 13, 18 (2007) ("[T]he Williams litigation provides a good start toward develop-
ing monitoring and reciprocal accountability schemes that promise local communities a
meaningful voice in school reform.").
165. See surveys taken for this Note, which asked teachers who work in Williams
schools to respond to questions regarding the Williams requirements (questions and re-
sponses are on file with The Scholar. St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues). While
most teachers agree that Williams requires textbooks in every classroom, the rest of the
mandates of Williams are misunderstood. Most teachers do not understand exactly what
Williams provides to schools, stating, for example: "I just know that you can get in trouble
if you don't have the required textbooks, I don't know about anything it provides except
for visits to check on compliance." More than one teacher said that the only thing Williams
provides is a printed version of the law to put on classroom bulletin boards.
166. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450, 526 (N.J. 1998) (emphasizing that
teachers are often called on to solve problems that state legislatures ignore).
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moves and public engagement so that, over time, voters see the results in
their local schools and programs function more or less automatically.
Amanda Broun's and Wendy Puriefoy's proposed model is likely to be
successful and, in fact, has had some success because it involves both the
interested parties (educational advocates and the affected community)
and those on the outside (policymakers and the larger community).167 If
the outside world can be involved and interested in solving the problems
of a community, demands for improvement will meet less resistance. This
will allow the problem of funding to be solved as people change their
attitudes about education spending and push litigators to do the same.
As well as lowering resistance, such a model generates political power
and takes some of the burden off of the affected community, as discussed
in Part II above. True public involvement and societal change is the only
thing likely to change the problem in a way that would eliminate the need
for future litigation. This is also likely to aid in efforts to change constitu-
tional protections (as might be helpful in Oklahoma and Louisiana), as
well as in creating change outside of the courts (as Pennsylvania has
forced advocates to do).
Third, because implementation of equity will never have an endpoint-
what is equitable is (necessarily) a constantly evolving concept-there
must be a move in the legislative arena to support litigation. Since legis-
lators respond to those who elect them, putting political power behind
educational equality is necessary. Much of this can be accomplished
through engaging the public, either through Broun's and Puriefoy's
model or through a similar model. In addition, the lawsuits themselves
have the power to spur lasting change. For example, the settlement in
Williams involved the state and, therefore, state legislators in the pro-
cess.' 68 Using the lawsuit as cover, legislators were able to put aside
politics and consider real solutions. In addition, it made the plan some-
thing that involved political power even prior to implementation. This is
likely to be successful over time. In contrast, Abbott put New Jersey's
legislature and its supreme court at odds, something that tests the power
of the court and allows state legislators to continue to refuse to act-after
all, if the solution is simply imposed on legislators, it is far easier to say no
than if legislators had developed and adopted the solution on their own.
Finally, putting pressure on state legislatures could also have the potential
of moving courts to reconsider the issue of justiciability. If the state legis-
167. Amanda R. Broun & Wendy D. Puriefoy, Public Engagement in School Reform:
Building Public Responsibility for Public Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 17,217,218,
236 (2008).
168. Notice of Proposed Settlement at 4-6, Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal.




lature defined the education guarantee so as to allow for judicial interpre-
tation, the courts could comfortably step into the role of interpreter
without feeling as if they were at odds with the legislature, thereby avoid-
ing the problems cited by the Pennsylvania court.
V. CONCLUSION
Dissenting in Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Justice Alma
Wilson characterized the current funding scheme thusly: "Such legislation
is the educational equivalent of sending one child to a thrift shop to buy
his school clothes while the neighboring child is sent to the tailor to have
his clothes handmade. I suppose we can say that both were clothed.' 1 69
Professor Koski would characterize adequacy suits as only assuring that
both children are clothed, but adequacy suits do not, in fact, stop there.
Adequacy suits, when informed by equity, push to ensure that both chil-
dren have the opportunity to get the same set of clothing in the end, even
if the resources each is given to reach that end differ.
169. Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 746 P.2d 1135, 1153 (Okla.
1987) (Wilson, J., dissenting).
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